"So what is wrong with undercapitalization in itself? The trustee argues that 'insufficient capital leads to financing the
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operation with secured debt, and that exposes unsecured commercial creditors to a greater risk of loss.' Quite so. But again, where is the wrong? Creditors extend credit voluntarily to a debtor. The debtor owes no duties to the creditor beyond those it promises in its contract (and beyond whatever common and statutory law may apply)… A lender will not offer a loan to a borrower unless the rate of return justifies the risk of default or underpayment… The higher that risk, the more interest (or collateral) the lender will demand. If a firm is poorly capitalized, and thus less likely to repay than a better capitalized firm in the same line of business, the lender may require more security or more interest. But that a highly leveraged company exposes its creditors to serious risks is no new fact of commerce. Creditors are free to lend elsewhere. If they choose to lend to a company that then loses their investment, they cannot go to bankruptcy court and cry misconduct" (In re Lifscultz Fast Freight).
ובלשון בית המשפט הפדרלי של ה-10th Circuit:
"As the Seventh Circuit concluded while analyzing the hazards of insider loans to undercapitalized debtors, 'while undercapitalization may indicate inequitable conduct, undercapitalization is not in itself inequitable conduct.'… The Lifschultz court reasoned that low capital resources increases the risk of loss for a lender or investor, but in a transparent market with good information flows, prices (and interest rates) will fluctuate accordingly, putting the lender or investor on notice about his risk" (In re Hedged - Investments Associates Inc., 380 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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הוצע גם שיקול פרקטי, שמשקלו אולי אינו פחות משל קודמו, ועניינו עידוד בעלי מניות להזרים הון לחברה כדי להצילה: "To hold otherwise would 'discourage those most interested in a corporation from attempting to salvage it through an infusion of capital'. Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 701" (In re Lifscultz Fast Freight). עד כאן מן הפסיקה האמריקאית, ערש לידתה של דוקטרינת ההדחיה. נשוב ונפנה למשפט הישראלי, ובפרט לפרשת קריספי (ע"א 2223/99 ויטלי קריספי נ' ח. אלקטרוניקה (1988) בע"מ, פ"ד נז(5) 116), בה נדונה לראשונה דוקטרינת הדחיית החוב במשפט הישראלי, ובה תומכים שני הצדדים את טיעוניהם המשפטיים.