17. כך הוא במשפטנו-שלנו, וכך הוא גם בשיטות משפט מקבילות של אנגליה (ראו: Companies Act 2006 c. 46, §§ 994, 996 (U.K.)), של קנדה (ראו, למשל: Ferguson v. Imax Systems Corp., 150 D.L.R. (3d) 718 (1983)) ושל ארצות-הברית (ראו, למשל: Manere v. Collins, 241 A.3d 133, 149-156 (Conn. 2020) (להלן: עניין Manere); וכן John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 662-671 (2007) (להלן: Matheson & Maler)). דברים שנאמרו באחרונה על ידי בית המשפט העליון של קונטיקט בעניינו של קיפוח המיעוט בחברות פרטיות – ובפרט, בחברות משפחתיות – נוגעים ישירות למקרים כדוגמת זה שלפנינו:
"The “reasonable expectations” standard analyzes the conduct at issue from the perspective of the minority shareholder. […] Oppression under this test should be deemed to arise only when the majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner’s decision to join the venture. […] This approach takes into account the fact that shareholders in close corporations may have expectations that differ substantially from those of shareholders in public corporations and further recognizes the fact sensitive nature of judicial inquiry into this area and the need to examine the understanding of the parties concerning their role in corporate affairs. […] Specifically […], a court considering a claim of oppression by an LLC member should consider, with regard to each reasonable expectation invoked by the plaintiff, whether the expectation: (i) contradicts any term of the operating agreement or any reasonable implication of any term of that agreement; (ii) was central to the plaintiff’s decision to become a member of the limited liability company or for a substantial time has been centrally important in the member’s continuing membership; (iii) was known to other members, who expressly or impliedly acquiesced in it; (iv) is consistent with the reasonable expectations of all the members, including expectations pertaining to the plaintiff’s conduct; and (v) is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. […] For instance, it is widely understood that, in addition to supplying capital to a contemplated or ongoing enterprise and expecting a fair and equitable return, parties comprising the ownership of a close corporation may expect to be actively involved in its management and operation. […] Shareholders in close corporations frequently consist of family members or friends and once the personal relationship is destroyed, the company deteriorates. [...] Unlike shareholders in larger corporations, minority shareholders in a close corporation cannot readily sell their shares when they become dissatisfied with the management of the corporation. [...] Indeed, the discord in the corporation makes the minority stock even more difficult to sell.”